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Abstract 
As part of the current debate on the reform of pension systems, this article 
examines the potential effects on consumption behaviour of implementing a 
lump-sum payment in a public pension system. This work explores an 
experimental investigation into retirement consumption behaviour with two 
central features: first, there exists a decreasing probability of surviving; second, 
there are two sequences of income, one when individual works and another 
when she is retired. The results show how subjects seem to plan their 
consumption and saving choices conditionated by both the long horizon with no 
incomes and the lump-sum payment. This yields, in the majority of periods, a 
surprising over-saving behaviour. 
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The reform of Social Security systems is now one of the main issues on 
the economic policy agenda of most industrialized countries. It is widely 
considered that, unless serious changes take place, the aging of the population 
implying a rise in the number of retirees relative to that of workers will threaten 
the viability of Pay-As-You-Go public pension systems in the long-run.  
Besides, this threat is being reinforced by the progressive reduction in 
the retirement age of the working population. Pension systems in virtually all 
OECD countries in the mid-1990s made it financially unattractive to work after 
the age of 55.1 Indeed, the general consensus in the theoretical literature 
related to Social Security and retirement decisions is that pension systems 
create enormous incentives to leave the labour force early. 2 This large decline 
in labour force participation is attributed to the specific fact that to keep on 
working implies a reduction in the present value of total pension benefits. That 
is, it is considered that the drop in pension wealth acts as an implicit tax on 
income from continued work and as such is a clear incentive to retire early. 
Reforms aiming to increase the effective retirement age to improve the 
financial problems of public pensions systems have mainly focussed on the 
reduction of this implicit tax on prolonging the working period. 
It is considered that when the increase in pension benefits is exactly 
offset by the higher cost in terms of contributions and foregone pensions, the 
pension system is not distorting the retirement decision. That is, the pension 
systems that are marginally actuarially fair do not distort the individual 
retirement decisions. For this reason, the main economic policy measures move 
in the direction of strengthening the link between life-time contributions and 
pension benefits.3  
However, Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2006) argue that “while 
there is no doubt that retirement systems induce an excessive bias towards 
early in many countries, a complete elimination of this bias (i.e., a switch to an 
actuarially fair system) is not the right answer. This is so and for two reasons. 
First, some distortions are second-best optimal. Second, depending on the 
political process, it may either not be feasible or alternatively it may tend to 
undermine the political support for the pension system itself.”4  
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Moreover, Fatas, Lacomba and Lagos (forthcoming) find with an 
experimental test that actuarially fair pension systems may not be neutral in 
terms of retirement decisions as identical expected payoffs generate different 
behaviors.  
Therefore, a key question is whether or not there exist alternative reforms 
to increase the effective retirement age. Orszag (2001), related to U.S. Social 
Security, considered that transforming Social Security's delayed retirement 
credit (given to people working between the ages of 62 and 65 in the U.S.) into 
a lump-sum payment rather than an increased monthly payment would likely 
encourage people to defer retirement. 
This question is adressed in Fatas, Lacomba and Lagos (forthcoming). 
They find that the more concentrated the payments (shifting from annuity into 
lump-sum), the more postponed the retirement decisions. This results suggests, 
in the line of Orszag (2001), that reforms aimed to delay effective retirement 
ages should transform the increases in pensions due to the additional years of 
work (after the standard retirement age) into a lump-sum payment rather than 
an increased periodic payment.  
Furthermore, it is likely that this transformation including a lump-sum 
payment would be easier to implement. Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999), 
using a questionnaire, found that more than 75 percent of the respondents to 
the survey preferred a one-time bonus to an increased annuity. On the other 
hand, in the U.S. private industry, whose retirement benefits may be distributed 
in several alternative ways, using some type of lump-sum benefit as a payment 
option has become popular as an alternative to annuity payments.5 
However, the incorporation of a lump-sum payment as a measure to 
delay retirement decisions requires further analysis before receiving full 
consideration by policymakers. Orszag (2001) states several important design 
issues that must be addressed before implementing a lump-sum payment 
system. In this paper we provide an experimental study on one of these issues: 
the impact on the poverty rates of the elderly of such a change.  
Orszag (2001) states that paying lump-sum payments might result in 
increases in poverty rates among those who already delay their retirement 
decisions after the normal retirement age if the lump sums were mostly 
consumed rather than saved. But the amount of the lump-sum that would be 
quickly consumed is not very clear. Unlike neoclassical theoretical predictions 
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about smooth consumption over time, some experimental works have shown 
that there is a close relationship between consumption and current income 
(Carbone and Hey, 2004). This suggests that some individuals might quickly 
consume a large amount of their lump-sum. However, Thaler (1992) finds that 
individuals are more likely to save a larger amount as the size of the lump-sum 
increases; and Hamermesh and Menchik (1987) state that there is a high 
average level of savings, far above what could be explained solely by planned 
saving for retirement. They explain this by introducing the bequest motive. 
On the other hand, as Fatas, Lacomba and Lagos (forthcoming) find, the 
lump-sum payment may induce workers to postpone retirement after the normal 
retirement age and, as Orszag (2001) suggests, this delay could potentially 
reduce poverty rates. 
The aim of this work is to provide additional empirical evidence to this 
debate. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental approach to examine a 
dynamic saving-consumption problem in a retirement framework. We consider 
an experimental investigation based on two central features: first, there exists a 
decreasing probability of surviving which implies an uncertain future income; 
and, secondly, there are two sequences of income, one when individual works 
and another when she is retired.  
This article claims not only to analyze how closely the predictions of the 
optimality theory fit the actual behavior of subjects in a lab, but also to test the 
potential effects on consumption behaviour of implementing a lump-sum 
payment in a public pension system.  
II. Experimental Background 
In the experimental literature into consumption behaviour under 
uncertainty there exist few contributions but relevant ones. For instance, Hey 
and Dardadoni (1988) describe a large-scale experimental investigation to test 
the implications of expected utility maximization on optimal consumption 
behaviour. They find that the actual behaviour in the lab differs significantly from 
the optimal behaviour, and that the comparative static implications of actual 
behaviour to agree with those of optimality theory. Carbone and Hey (2004) 
investigate the over-sensitivity of consumption to current income. They adopt a 
simple model in which income in any period can take just one of two values: 
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employment and unemployment. They find that subjects over-react and do not 
seem to be able to smooth their consumption stream sufficiently.  
On the other hand, Ballinger et al (2003) study social learning about the 
life cycle saving task. They use experimental methods to study a household 
intertemporal choice problem. Subjects participate in three-member “families”. 
Second and third “generation” subjects observe and/or communicate with their 
“antecedent” first or second generation subject. They find that later generations 
perform significantly better than earlier generations. Brown, Camerer and Chua 
(2006) establish potential ways in which consumers can attain near-optimal 
consumption behaviour. In line with Ballinger et al (2003), individual and social 
learning mechanisms are proposed to be one possible link. They find that while 
consumers persistently spend too much in early periods, they learn rapidly from 
their own experience and from experience of others to consume amounts close 
to optimal levels.  
Our work presents some interesting differences with regard to all above 
mentioned papers. In order to capture a retirement and pension system 
benchmark, we focus on how subjects make saving and consumption choices 
with two novel features. First, subjects face a decreasing probability of surviving 
across periods. Second, participants receive three different levels of income 
according to a retirement period (R hereafter): i) a constant level of income 
during each period before R (as worker); ii) a higher lump-sum of income in R 
(the first period as retired); and iii) nothing from R on. 
This last sequence with no income is a novel feature in this literature. In 
all above mentioned papers subjects received a positive amount of income in 
each and every period. Thus, this is the first experimental analysis of 
consumption and savings decisions of subjects faced to periods with no income. 
 
 
III. The model 
Consider an individual who has to decide on his optimum consumption at 
different age in presence of uncertainty about the length of life. Suppose that 
this is the only uncertainty that the individual faces. Let T>0 be the planning 
horizon, that is, maximum lifetime. Lifetime uncertainty is presented by a 
survival distribution function, F(t) non increasing in age, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, that satisfies 
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F(0)=1.6 All individuals are assumed to have the same survival distribution 
function, F(t). 
 
Denote consumption at age t by c(t), where c(t)≥0. Utility from 
consumption at different ages is separable and independent of age. There is no 
subjective discount rate.7 We use a specific utility function, u(c) that displays 
risk-aversion, and to ensure an interior solution, satisfies the Inada conditions.8 
When working, the individual provides one unit of labor. Contingent on survival, 
the individual works between ages 0 and R, 0<R<T, that is, there exists a 
mandatory retirement age that occurs at R. The individual's objective function is 
to maximize the non discounted expected utility V 
Let wages at age t, be w(t)≥0. Savings earn a zero rate of interest.9 With 
no initial assets, the individual's assets at age t, S(t), are equal to the 
cumulative savings. Feasible consumption plans must have non-negative 
assets at all ages 
 
We assume that w(t)=w for all 0<t<R, therefore the restriction becomes 
 
The choice of the optimum consumption path will depend on the 
insurance options available. We analyze two different scenarios, first the case in 
which individuals will receive a constant pension, from the age of retirement on, 
and secondly individual receives a unique lump-sum payment the period of 
retirement. 
Concerning the case in which individuals will receive a constant pension, 
we assume that the total expected value of contributions is equal to total 






















therefore, the constant pension each period for each individual 
Therefore the restriction over total savings becomes 
Assuming that at the retirement, the agent receives a unique payment, 
the total value of expected contributions has to be equal than the lump-sum 
payments, that is, 
then the lump-sum payment is 
 
Restriction on savings is now 
 
Comparing the two scenarios, we can observe that they reflect an 
increasing on income, permanent and temporal respectively. Therefore going 
from the regime with no pensions to the others will imply an increase on 
consumption, that will be smaller in the case of a lump-sum payment, since 
increment of income is also smaller. 
IV. Experimental design 
Our experimental design tries to capture some actual features of a public 
pension system with a unique and actuarially fair lump-sum payment. The 
experiment consists of three sequences of at most 30 rounds and one decision 
per round. See Table 1 into Appendix. 



















































-------------------- Insert Table 1 here ------------------- 
 
Each round is characterized by a probability of surviving. As the round 
number increases, the probability of surviving decreases. In each round 
reached, the subject either survives or not. A subject reaches a round if, and 
only if, she has survived all earlier rounds.  
During the first R rounds, similar to wage earnings, the subject receives 
85 experimental units in each reached round (Income). In the next round, the 
subject receives the present value of the total pension benefits as a unique 
lump-sum payment. In the rest of the rounds the subject receives nothing. 
Experimental units can be saved to provide wealth but savings earn no interest. 
In each round subject has to take a decision concerning how much of 
their Cash Available, which is the addition of what is left over from previous 
rounds, and the new amount coming from Income, she wishes to convert into 
points in that round. Let us denote C the amount consumed by the subject. The 
subject is informed of the conversion scale (from experimental units to points). 
Thus, she is told that C experimental units generate 10*Square Root (C) points. 
She is also told that borrowing is not allowed, that is, the subject cannot spend 
more than their Available Cash. A table similar to Table 1 showing how different 
consumption choices are converted into points is given separately to the 
subject. 
As mentioned above, the subject plays three sequences. She is told that 
at the end of the experiment she will be paid in cash the total amount of points 
converted from experimental units of one of the three sequences with an 
exchange rate of 100 points = €2 (around USD 2.5, at that time) and that any 
unconverted experimental unit remaining at the end of any sequence is 
worthless. She is also told that the sequence to be paid is randomly chosen. 
 As a strategy to analyze the effect of the length of the retirement period 
on the savings and spending decisions, we design two treatments. In Treatment 
1 (LS10) the round R is the round 10 and therefore subjects have at most 19 
rounds with no income and in Treatment 2 (LS15) the round R is the round 15 
and the rounds with no income are at most 14.  
Actuarially fair retirement benefits 
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Reforms aiming to achieve actuarially fair social security systems must 
adjust pension benefits to achieve that the increase in pension benefits be 
exactly offset by the higher cost in terms of contributions and foregone 
pensions. 
In the same way, in this experimental design we have adjusted payoffs to 
keep the same result. That is, we have to consider a gross wage of 100 
experimental units and a tax rate of 15%. Thus, an actuarially fair pension 
system implies that the lump-sum payment in LS10 is equal to 191.25 
experimental units (with R=10) and in LS15 is equal to 345 experimental units 
(with R=15).  
Risk aversion  
Whenever decisions involving tradeoffs between costs and benefits 
occurring at different points in time are uncertain, we find it essential to consider 
individual attitudes towards risk. The expected utility theory predicts that, 
regardless the treatment, the more risk averse the subject is, the larger her first 
rounds’ consumption will be. In order to analyze whether or not this attitude 
plays a role in consumption and savings decisions, we introduce into our design 
an additional risk aversion test.  
Following Holt and Laury (2002), a menu of ten paired lottery choices 
allows us to measure the degree of risk aversion. The payoffs for option A are 
less variable than the potential payoffs for option B. As the decision number 
increases, the probability of the high payoff increases. Thus only risk-loving 
subjects would take option B in the first decision and only risk-averse subjects 
would choose option B in the second last decision. A risk-neutral subject should 
cross over to option B when the expected value of each option is about the 
same. That is, a risk-neutral subject would choose option A in the first four 
decisions before switching to option B (see the Appendix for details). 
V. Experimental procedures 
A total of 39 undergraduate students in Business and Economics from 
the University of Valencia took part in the experiment in December 2006. All 
sessions were run at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics 
(LINEEX) and the standard electronic recruitment procedures were used to 
collect the subject pool. The experiment consisted of two treatments: LS10 and 
LS15. 20 subjects participated at LS10 and 19 subjects at LS15.  
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All participants knew that they would be privately paid according to the 
outcome generated by both their choice and the random process of passing 
rounds. At the end of each treatment, all subjects were asked to participate in 
an additional risk aversion test. This test was paid independently and subjects 
could refuse to participate in the test.  
In the risk aversion test, subjects made ten sequential choices between 
two alternative options, A and B. All participants knew that they would be paid 
according to the outcome generated by one of their ten choices.  
 Instructions were read aloud before the beginning of each stage and 
participants only had information about the individual payoffs obtained at the 
different treatments and tests. At the end of the experiment subjects were 
privately paid with an exchange rate of 125 experimental units = €1. The 
experiment took less than 90 minutes and average earnings were around 15 
euros, the maximum earnings going above €40. Experimental instructions are 
provided in the Appendix. To make sure subjects understood the several 
instructions, they needed to complete a quiz after the instructions were read 
aloud to the group and before the experiments began. The explanations were 
repeated until nobody made a mistake (this was true from the beginning, 
probably due to the simplicity of the design).  
VI. Results 
The analysis of results is divided into four subsections. The first 
subsection compares consumption and saving choices in each sequence for 
both treatments, relative to the optimal levels. The second subsection examines 
in detail the saving-consumption choices before, during and after the lump-sum 
payment. The last two subsections include some regression analysis of the 
significance of the impact of the different variables at work. 
Comparing actual behaviour to optimal behaviour 
Table 2 below presents the summary statistics of the individual’s 
decisions in terms of average consumption, average saving and average cash 
available decisions in the case of LS10 (with 20 individuals) and LS15 (with 29 
individuals) for any sequence and for the total. To compare we present the 
optimal decisions of consumption, saving and available cash. We also include 
the variable “Difconabs” meaning the differences on average between actual 
consumption and optimal consumption in absolute terms. The variable “Average 
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life” denotes the average number of periods that the individual is alive. Finally 
we present the number of observations for each sequence and for the total. 
 
-------------------- Insert Table 2 here ------------------- 
 
Results report that subjects performed consumption and saving decisions 
poorly with respect to the optimal levels in both treatments. In Table 3, statistical 
tests show that the actual behaviour (consumption-saving) differs from the 
optimal behaviour in each sequence.  
 
-------------------- Insert Table 3 here ------------------- 
 
When we analyze the consumption choices across sequences we find 
that the differences between pairs of sequences 1, 2 and 3 in both LS10 and 
LS15 are always significant, with the only exception of sequences 1 and 2 in 
LS10 and LS15. The same is true when we look at savings choices. In this 
case, the only exception occurs between sequences 1 and 2 in LS15. Although 
the actual consumption and saving choices do not show a convergence towards 
the optimal levels when the participants play more sequences, the standard 
deviation (in Table 2) fall as more and more subjects make decisions. Besides, 
this reduction in the standard deviation across sequences there seems to be a 
systematic trend in all variables (except obviously for “Alive expectancy” and 
“#Observations” variables). Moreover, the “Difconabs” variable exhibits not only 
a lower standard deviation across sequences (from 37.66 in sequence 1 to 
25.89 in sequence 3), but also a lower difference in absolute terms between 
actual and optimal consumption behaviour (from 30.17 in sequence 1 to 25.63 
in sequence 3). That is, subjects seem to adjust better when the number of 
decisions increases. This result supports the potential importance of learning to 
solve dynamic optimization problem found by Ballinger et al (2003) and 
Camerer and Chua (2005). 
To facilitate the comparison of the average actual consumption with the 
optimal consumption each period over all individuals we plot them in Figure 1 
and 2 for LS10 and LS15 respectively . We observe that both treatments exhibit 
a similar consumption pattern.  
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-------------------- Insert Figures 1 and 2 here ------------------- 
 
Unlike other works in this experimental literature that found that the 
behaviour of the majority of the subjects was such that they consumed too 
much in the early stages of the experiment, our participants under-consume in 
the earliest periods.10 This under-consumption behaviour is extended during 
even more periods in LS15. However, in both treatments, after a first block of 
periods, subjects over-consume until they reach the lump-sum period. After the 
lump-sum period, participants seem to smooth their consumption decisions. In 
fact, while in LS10 the consumption choices seem to fit optimal consumption 
path from period 12 on (with the exception of sequence 1), in LS15 subjects 
again exhibit a cyclical behaviour (compared to the optimal one): under-
consume from period 17 until period 26-27; over-consume from period 26-27 
until the end. 
Now we analyze the deviations on average from the optimal saving 
choices, see Figures 3 and 4 for LS10 and LS15 respectively. The Figure 3 is 
very illustrative. It can be observed that subjects perform saving choices poorly 
with regard to the optimal level in each sequence; however it is very enlightened 
to observe how subjects over-save in all periods and for all sequences.  
 
-------------------- Insert Figures 3 and 4 here ------------------- 
 
In Figure 4 it can be appreciated that although subjects over-save the 
majority of periods, however in the central periods, participants over-reacted 
around to the lump-sum period, saving below the optimal level. There exist two 
possible explanations. First, subjects have an accumulated saving high enough. 
Second, the lump-sum payment is high enough and the number of remaining 
periods is not so large. 
Comparing these two treatments one might deduce that the larger the 
horizon with no income together with a lower lump-sum payment, the higher the 
saving reaction. It could be seen as precautionary savings. 
In Hey and Dardadoni (1988) and Carbone and Hey (2004) there is a 
certain and known rate of return per period on all money saved. In Ballinger et 
al (2003) and Camerer and Chua (2005) the incentives to save money are 
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embedded in the particular utility function that they use for the experiment. The 
incentives to smooth the consumption across periods are very salient. 
However, it is worth to emphasizing that in our experimental design 
savings earn no interest and the utility function, although being concave, differs 
of that used by Ballinger et al (2003) and Camerer and Chua (2005). Saving 
money is not so prominent. We tried to study the savings behavior in a context 
as neutral as possible. Therefore as exposed before, the answer we find is 
surprising.  
The effect of the lump-sum payment on savings decisions  
In this subsection we analyze how the existence of the lump-sum 
payment affects savings decisions of subjects.  
 First, we study the effects of the lump-sum payment on subjects’ 
behaviour during the working period, that is, during the rounds previous to the 
lump-sum receipt. Table 4 shows the ratio consumption/endowment during the 
first 16 rounds in the two different environments (LS10 and LS15). 
 
-------------------- Insert Table 4 here ------------------- 
 
The first three columns give the ratio consumption/endowment per period 
in the three sequences of the LS10 treatment. The fourth column gives the 
average ratio of these three sequences. The fifth column shows the optimal 
ratios in the LS10 treatment. Note that since we focus here on the pre lump-
sum subjects’ behaviour, from round 12 on the first five columns have no data. 
The sixth, seventh and eighth columns give the ratios consumption/endowment 
in the three sequences of the LS15 treatment. The ninth column gives the 
average ratio of the three previous sequences and the last column shows the 
optimal ratios in the LS15 treatment.  
The existence of a large lump-sum payment at the end of the working 
period might have induced subjects to over-consume in the rounds previous to 
the lump-sum and to use this payment as the main (or even unique) source of 
financing for the retirement period. However, results suggest that the weight of 
the future rounds with no income in subjects’ behaviour prevented them from 
over-consuming during the pre lump-sum rounds.  
As we can see in Table 4, in LS10 the optimal behaviour in the pre-lump-
sum rounds is to consume on average an 82.60% of the endowment of these 
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ten first rounds. However, results show that on average, subjects consumed 
around 70% of this endowment. The under-consumption is observed in the 
three sequences. Moreover, the average consumption during the 10 first rounds 
decreased with the sequences (75,88% in the first sequence, 68,79% in the 
second one and 66,1% in the last one). 
The lower number of rounds with no income and/or the larger lump-sum 
payment in LS15 led subjects to higher consumption levels in the pre lump-sum 
rounds.  The obtained results were very close to the optimal behaviour (the 
optimal consumption is around 88% of the endowment of the fifteen first rounds 
and, on average, subjects consumed 90%). 
Note that this under consumption come mainly from the very first rounds, 
where subjects saved an important part of the endowment being the optimal 
behaviour not to do it (in LS10 the optimal behaviour is to consume the whole 
endowment in the first three rounds and in LS15 in the eight first rounds).  
With respect to the consumption in the round associated with the lump-
sum payment, we find that subjects over-reacted to this payment, in the sense 
that they consumed an amount of the lump-sum larger than the optimal amount. 
While in LS10 the optimal behaviour is to consume around 25% of the lump-
sum and subjects consumed around 44%, in LS15 the optimal behaviour is to 
consume around 26% of the lump-sum and subjects consumed around 39%. 
This result is in the same direction that Thaler (1992). He found that individuals 
are more likely to save a larger amount as the size of the lump-sum increases. 
In our case, the lower amount of lump-sum saved in LS10 might come from the 
fact that subjects over saved in the pre lump-sum rounds. 
On the other hand, one of the main problems associated with the 
implementation of a lump-sum payment in the pension system is that people 
might consume the lump-sum payment rather quickly. If so, Orszag (2001) 
states that paying lump-sum payments might result in increases in poverty rates 
among those who already delay their retirement decisions after the normal 
retirement age. Indeed, unlike neoclassical theoretical predictions about smooth 
consumption over time, some experimental works have shown that there is a 
close relationship between consumption and current income (Carbone and Hey, 
2004) suggesting that some individuals might quickly consume a large amount 
of their lump-sum. However, our results are in the opposite direction. In spite of 
the over-reaction to the lump-sum payment, subjects did not consume the 
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whole lump-sum payment quickly. This can be oberved with the help of the 
figures. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the average accumulated savings of subjects per 
round in each sequence compared with the optimal accumulated savings.  
As we can observe in Figure 4, the over consumption of the lump-sum in 
LS10 is not large enough and therefore the average accumulated savings of 
subjects in each round of the retirement period is always higher than the optimal 
one. In Figure 4 we observe the same results for LS15 except for the rounds 
between round 15 and 20. But in these cases the differences are not very large. 
Since the accumulated savings in the retirement period is equivalent to 
the available cash, our results suggest that lump-sum payments should not 
result in increases in poverty rates among those who already delay their 
retirement decisions after the normal retirement age. 
Regression analysis 
Finally, we use regression analysis to explore the determinants of the 
differences on consumption from the individual’s decisions and optimal 
decisions. The dependent variable is the log of absolute deviation from 
optimality, i.e., ln(Difcons). A negative coefficient means a variable lowers the 
deviation from optimality. Since the dependent variable is the logged deviation, 
the coefficient means that a variable causes a certain percentage of increase or 
decrease in deviation relative to when this variable is absent. 
We consider different groups of explanatory variables. First, a set of 
indicators built from the risk aversion test made to individuals. The variable 
“risk” goes from 0 to 10, meaning that the higher the value of the variable, the 
more risk averse the individual is. Secondly, we decompose the former variable 
into two dummies, one called “riskaverse”, that takes value 1 if individual is risk 
averse and 0 otherwise, and the other one, called “riskloving”, that takes value 1 
if individual is risk lover and 0 otherwise. We also include the variable “Raven 
Test” which is built from a “test de inteligencia”, as the ratio of correct answers 
to the total number of questions. 
Secondly, a set of demographic variables that includes sex, education 
level of mother and father, “Relig” as a measure of membership of a religious 
community, “Frecrelig” as la frecuencia de asistencia a oficios religiosos, and 
“Politics” which is a categorized value from left position to right position. 
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Finally, because of the decreased probability of survival as more periods 
are played, participants should be able to make worse decisions, then we 
include de variable “period” and we expect a positive coefficient. The “period 
squared” variable simply takes into account any possible non-linearity that the 
period variable may have and it may have either sign. Regressions were run 
separately for each treatment and pooled data, in which we include the dummy 
for the treatment “dumbreak”, and also a dummy for the sequence. We report 
the estimation results in Table 5. Note that the regressions are run previously 
with all individuals and then with only the individuals that remain alive. 
 
-------------------- Insert Table 5 here ------------------- 
 
The coefficients of sequence dummy variables show that individuals 
learn when the break is larger (2nd treatment LS15) and they do not learn when 
the break is shorter (1st treatment LS10), while when we use the pooled data 
there is a weak evidence of learning. When using pooled data the second 
treatment reduces the deviation from optimal consumption, as the negative 
coefficient of “dumbreak” variable exhibits. The period variable is positive, 
meaning that …. The pattern of coefficients on Period and Period Squared 
shows that deviations increase at a decreasing rate as more periods are played. 
Females appear to deviate more in almost all cases.  
When including the variables measuring the risk preference (“risk”), we 
observe that the more risk averse the individual is, the lower differences 
between her decisions and the optimal decisions. When decomposing the 
sample by treatment, the results do not change. If it does, it concerns to the 
significance level. When decomposing the variable into the dummies 
“riskaverse” and “riskloving” the results do not change. The “Raven test” 
variable presents a significant and positive sign. 
The influence of parents’ education is not conclusive. In the case of 
pooled data and the treatment LS10, only mother’s education (“edumother”) 
makes the deviations increase, while in the case of treatment LS15, both, 
father’s and mother’s education affect the deviations in compensating way, 
although mother’s educations coefficient is larger than that of father’s education. 
The variable “Relig” presents a positive sign in treatment LS10 while a negative 
one in treatment LS15. The same result for “Frecrelig” variable. The variable 
 17
“Politics” always displays a positive and significant effect. Females appear to 
deviate more in almost all cases.  
Behavioural models 
Following Camerer and Chua (2005), a natural behavioural explanation for 
patterns of consumption is a “rule of thumb” in which subjects simply spend a 
fixed fraction of their current income or a fraction of cash-on-hand. To 
investigate these alternative explanations, we ran regressions in which the log 
of actual consumption was regressed against the optimal level of consumption 
and either current income or current cash-on-hand (i.e, current income plus 
savings). Table 6 summarizes the results2.  
 
-------------------- Insert Table 6 here ------------------- 
 
As in earlier analysis, the best model puts a larger weight on the optimal level of 
consumption than in current income or cash-on-hand. Besides, the coefficient of 
“Current Income” is larger than that of “Cash-on-hand”, which means that 
individuals decide their consumption level not considering savings. This can be 
an explanation of the over-saving behaviour found in previous sections. The 
incremental R-squared from adding the either “rule of thumb” variables (income 
and cash-on-hand) to the optimal consumption is small when considering cash-
on-hand but large in the case of current income.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
One of the proposal in the current debate on the possible Social Security 
reforms to achieve a delay in the effective retirement age is to transform the 
increases in pensions due to the additional years of work (after the standard 
retirement age) into a lump-sum payment rather than an increased periodic 
payment. It was firstly suggested by Orszag (2001) related to U.S. Social 
Security. He considered that transforming Social Security's delayed retirement 
credit (given to people working between the ages of 62 and 65 in the U.S.) into 
a lump-sum payment rather than an increased monthly payment would likely 
encourage people to defer retirement. 
                                                 
2 Fixed effects are included to adjust for the possibility that some subjects saved more than 
others. The estimates of those variables are omitted for simplicity of the table. Although not in 
the table, we have also performed the analysis by sequence for any of the treatments and for 
pooled data. Since the results do not change for simplicity we only present results by treatment. 
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However, one important issue related to this measure would be the 
impact on the poverty rates of the elderly of such a change. People might 
consume the lump-sum payment rather quickly. If so, paying lump-sum 
payments might result in increases in poverty rates among those who already 
delay their retirement decisions after the normal retirement age. 
In this paper we focus on this specific issue. We present an experimental 
test to analyze whether the incorporation of a lump-sum payment as a measure 
to delay retirement decisions might lead to higher levels of poverty rates.  
With reference to the effect of the lump-sum payment on savings 
decisions, we found that when individuals know that there are future rounds with 
no income, they smooth consumption over time more than previous 
experimental works where it is observed a close relationship between 
consumption and current income. Indeed, subjects over-save during their 
working period. The existence of a large lump-sum payment at the end of this 
period did not prevent this under consumption. It has to be noted that the over-
savings was higher the larger the retirement period.  
Regarding the lump-sum round, we found a small over-reaction with 
respect to the payment in consumption decisions. In this case, the over-reaction 
was greater the larger the retirement period. 
Finally, with respect to the post lump-sum rounds, we found that on 
average the available cash of subjects was in most of these rounds larger than 
the optimal one. This result was stronger in the treatment with the larger 
retirement period where the available cash was always larger than the optimal 
one. 
This result suggests that it is very unlikely that the introduction of a lump-
sum payment in pension systems causes an increase in elderly poverty rates. 
Indeed, if this lump-sum payment would induce workers to delay retirement 
after the normal retirement age then poverty rates could be potentially reduced. 
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Table 1:Experimental Design 






Available Consumption Savings 
Obtained 
Points 
1 1 85 85 85 --- --- --- 
2 29/30 85 85     
3 28/29 85 85     
4 27/28 85 85     
5 26/27 85 85     
6 25/26 85 85     
7 24/25 85 85     
8 23/24 85 85     
9 22/23 85 85     
10 21/22 85 85     
11 20/21 191,25 85     
12 19/20  85     
13 18/19  85     
14 17/18  85     
15 16/17  85     
16 15/16  345     
17 14/15       
18 13/14       
19  12/13       
20  11/12       
21  10/11       
22   9/10       
23   8/9        
24   7/8        
25   6/7        
26   5/6        
27   4/5        
28   3/4        
29   2/3        
30   1/2        
       0,00 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 LS10  LS15 
  Total Seq = 1 Seq = 2 Seq = 3 Optimal  Total Seq = 1 Seq = 2 Seq = 3 Optimal 
Consumption 43,82 49,32 40,27 43,74 34,71  66,22 65,89 68,11 65,11 54 
 (44,20) (50,51) (44,61) (36,62)   (44,65) (50,35) (44,18) (40,47)  
Savings 152,8 148,0 149,6 161,4 67,75  101,4 111,8 89,4 102,5 78,84 
 (187,35) (198,69) (187,81) (176,36)   (135,31) (144,99) (128,05) (132,75)  
Cash available 196,6 197,3 189,9 205,2 102,5  167,6 177,7 157,5 167,6 132,8 
 (191,28) (197,28) (196,21) (179,00)   (135,89) (144,09) (127,74) (135,25)  
Difconabs 27,54 30,17 27,24 25,63   25,53 27,65 27,55 22,54  
 (32,19) (37,66) (32,48) (25,89)   (36,40) (43,27) (32,69) (33,23)  
Average life 21,96 19,76 24,37 20,64   21,31 20,91 19,13 23,18  
 (7,12) (8,04) (5,95) (6,75)   (7,08) (7,96) (7,50) (5,43)  
# Obs. 1002 275 418 309 30  945 281 278 386 30 
Standard Deviation between brackets. 
 
Table 3: Statistical Tests 
 R=10  R=15 
Consumption Total Seq = 1 Seq = 2 Seq = 3 Optimal   Total Seq = 1 Seq = 2 Seq = 3 Optimal
Total 0,00 1,64 1,37 0,03 6,52  0,00 0,10 0,63 0,44 8,41 
Seq=1  0,00 2,42 1,51 4,80   0,00 0,55 0,21 3,96 
Seq=2   0,00 1,15 2,55    0,00 0,89 5,33 
Seq=3    0,00 4,33     0,00 5,39 
Optimal         0,00           0,00 
            
 R=10  R=15 
Saving Total Seq = 1 Seq = 2 Seq = 3 Optimal   Total Seq = 1 Seq = 2 Seq = 3 Optimal
Total 0,00 0,36 0,29 0,74 2,49  0,00 1,07 1,36 0,14 0,91 
Seq=1  0,00 0,11 0,86 6,70   0,00 1,94 0,85 3,81 
Seq=2   0,00 0,87 8,91    0,00 1,28 1,37 
Seq=3    0,00 9,34     0,00 3,50 




















Table 4: Ratio Consumption to Endowment 
 R=10  R=15 
Period Seq=1 Seq=2 Seq=3 Total Opt.  Seq=1 Seq=2 Seq=3 Total Opt. 
1 52,06 48,29 54,53 51,63 100,00  71,76 69,29 74,24 71,76 100,00 
2 78,02 61,24 53,68 64,26 100,00  79,35 82,97 78,43 80,30 100,00 
3 63,73 62,29 58,50 61,52 100,00  77,71 81,96 91,76 83,81 100,00 
4 68,63 63,53 69,07 66,97 94,45  110,03 102,08 92,48 101,36 100,00 
5 84,78 66,87 83,67 78,00 87,58  85,96 86,78 93,46 88,88 100,00 
6 120,00 72,51 74,71 87,46 80,98  85,22 101,38 87,25 91,33 100,00 
7 69,33 83,59 67,37 74,36 74,63  80,31 92,32 85,49 86,26 100,00 
8 80,09 66,99 59,06 68,13 68,54  73,16 95,61 94,46 89,41 100,00 
9 87,25 84,43 75,92 82,30 62,71  85,99 77,65 95,85 87,20 97,56 
10 64,28 82,56 70,50 73,83 57,14  135,83 129,32 92,39 115,75 88,89 
11 41,41 50,96 37,24 44,05 24,71  81,18 71,55 94,12 84,10 80,63 
12 - - - -   120,13 103,53 97,30 104,74 72,77 
13 - - - -   87,32 79,61 94,85 88,82 65,31 
14 - - - -   80,00 99,22 86,03 87,92 58,25 
15 - - - -   115,29 84,41 96,22 98,71 51,60 
16 - - - -   37,81 33,51 42,13 38,65 26,41 





                                                 
3 This is the average ratio of the pre lump-sum rounds, that is, the 10 first rounds in LS10 and the 15 first 






Table 5: Regression Analysis 
LN(DIFCONS)   POOLED DATA   BREAK=10  BREAK=15  POOLED DATA  BREAK=10  
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  
Alive  -1.098*** -1.072***  -0.673*** -0.680*** -2.020*** -2.020***   
  [0.119] [0.118]  [0.103] [0.102]  [0.263] [0.263]        
Dumbreak  -0.119 -0.114        -0.520*** -0.415***     
  [0.081] [0.083]        [0.142] [0.141]     
Seq 1  0.165 0.170  0.050 0.049  0.261 0.261  0.168 0.268  -0.021 -0.017  
  [0.117] [0.117]  [0.100] [0.100]  [0.230] [0.230]  [0.217] [0.217]  [0.205] [0.205]  
Seq 2  0.257** 0.257**  0.247** 0.248**  -0.096 -0.096  -0.305 -0.192  0.406** 0.440**  
  [0.115] [0.115]  [0.101] [0.101]  [0.232] [0.232]  [0.199] [0.200]  [0.179] [0.175]  
Period  0.517*** 0.517***  0.353*** 0.352***  0.804*** 0.804***  0.491*** 0.503***  0.348*** 0.348***  
  [0.023] [0.023]  [0.020] [0.020]  [0.044] [0.044]  [0.041] [0.042]  [0.037] [0.037]  
Period Squared -0.018*** -0.018***  -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.024*** -0.024***  -0.016*** -0.017***  -0.014*** -0.014***  
  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.001] [0.001]  
Riskaverse  -0.303**   -0.372***   0.000   -0.552**   -0.304   
  [0.142]   [0.143]   [0.000]   [0.276]   [0.299]   
Riskloving  -0.333*   -0.233   8.853***   -1.350***   -0.232   
  [0.176]   [0.176]   [1.879]   [0.319]   [0.351]   
Risk   -0.048   -0.099**   -0.765***   0.056   -0.091  
   [0.040]   [0.043]   [0.162]   [0.078]   [0.089]  
Raven Test  0.041* 0.042*  -0.030 -0.041  0.665*** 0.208***  0.188*** 0.164***  0.319* 0.292*  
  [0.022] [0.022]  [0.099] [0.095]  [0.140] [0.053]  [0.038] [0.038]  [0.192] [0.177]  
Sex  0.304*** 0.293***  0.027 -0.038  -2.211*** 2.052***  0.822*** 0.827***  0.071 0.047  
  [0.109] [0.109]  [0.094] [0.092]  [0.685] [0.411]  [0.197] [0.199]  [0.171] [0.173]  
Edufather  -0.000 -0.008  -0.001 -0.013  0.784*** 0.007  0.035* 0.019  -0.024 -0.034*  
  [0.010] [0.009]  [0.010] [0.008]  [0.178] [0.045]  [0.019] [0.019]  [0.021] [0.019]  
Edumother  0.022** 0.025***  0.034*** 0.035***  -2.037*** -0.179**  0.012 0.023  0.020 0.020  
  [0.009] [0.009]  [0.007] [0.007]  [0.430] [0.078]  [0.015] [0.015]  [0.014] [0.013]  
Politics  0.083* 0.112***  0.057 0.074  1.953*** 0.423***  0.117 0.188**  0.398*** 0.408***  
  [0.045] [0.043]  [0.053] [0.051]  [0.386] [0.100]  [0.081] [0.079]  [0.122] [0.113]  
Religion  0.003 -0.009  0.049*** 0.036***  -1.673*** -0.329***  0.061** 0.023  0.092*** 0.081***  
  [0.016] [0.015]  [0.014] [0.013]  [0.295] [0.062]  [0.030] [0.028]  [0.025] [0.022]  
Frecrelig  0.158*** 0.160***  0.153*** 0.161***  -8.335*** -1.012***  0.336*** 0.352***  0.379*** 0.383***  
  [0.054] [0.054]  [0.042] [0.041]  [1.622] [0.287]  [0.100] [0.100]  [0.092] [0.089]  
Constant  -0.131 -0.112  -0.009 0.459  85.223*** 14.344***  1.141 -0.735  -2.569** -2.169*  
    [1.059] [1.129]   [0.477] [0.551]  [17.513] [3.929]  [1.862] [1.958]  [1.000] [1.221]  
Observations  2250 2250  1440 1440  810 810  1172 1172  754 754  
R-squared   0.28 0.28   0.45 0.44  0.43 0.43  0.22 0.21  0.19 0.19  












Table 6: Behavioural Analysis 
    POOLED DATA  LS10   LS15 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2  MODEL 1 MODEL 2   MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Opt. Consumption -0.018 -0.371***  1.088* 1.141*  -0.191 -1.196*** 
  [0.121] [0.132]  [0.573] [0.605]  [0.169] [0.153] 
Current Income  0.384***   0.365***   0.368***  
  [0.024]   [0.040]   [0.034]  
Cash on Hand   0.006   -0.009   0.068*** 
      [0.008]    [0.010]     [0.017] 
Observations  1172 1172  754 754  418 418 
R-squared  0.41 0.28  0.31 0.23  0.53 0.42 
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Risk aversion test 
Risk Aversion Test 
 Option A Option B   
Decision High Payoff Low Payoff High Payoff Low Payoff Option 
1 1/10 200 9/10 160 1/10 385 9/10 10 A B 
2 2/10 200 8/10 160 2/10 385 8/10 10 A B 
3 3/10 200 7/10 160 3/10 385 7/10 10 A B 
4 4/10 200 6/10 160 4/10 385 6/10 10 A B 
5 5/10 200 5/10 160 5/10 385 5/10 10 A B 
6 6/10 200 4/10 160 6/10 385 4/10 10 A B 
7 7/10 200 3/10 160 7/10 385 3/10 10 A B 
8 8/10 200 2/10 160 8/10 385 2/10 10 A B 
9 9/10 200 1/10 160 9/10 385 1/10 10 A B 
10 1 200 0 160 1 385 0 10 A B 
 
Footnotes
                                                 
1 See Gruber and Wise (1997) or Blondal and Scarpetta (1998). 
2 Many studies have analyzed the relationship between retirement and Social Security. Earlier 
literature mainly focussed on the effect of the introduction of a pension system on the individual 
retirement decision, see among others, Feldstein (1977), Sheshinski (1978), Kotlikoff (1979a; 
1979b), Crawford and Lilien (1981) or Cremer and Pestieau (2000). There is however more 
recent literature dealing with the retirement decision in a political economy environment, see 
Crettez and Le Maitre (2002), Conde-Ruiz et al. (2003; 2005), Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003; 
2004), Casamatta et al. (2005), or Lacomba and Lagos (2006; forthcoming). 
3 The link between lifetime contributions and benefits is being reinforced in a number of 
countries, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, etc., by shifting from defined-
benefit to defined-contribution systems. See Blondal and Scarpetta (1998). 
4 An alternative way of raising the effective retirement age might be to delay the legal retirement 
age. If so, Lacomba and Lagos (forthcoming) find that it would be appropriate to combine that 
measure with an increase in the redistributive character of the pension system. This higher 
intra-generational redistribution would delay the preferred legal retirement age of most of voters, 
which would result in a larger degree of approval in the postponement of the legal retirement 
age. 
5 See Moore and Muller (2002) or Blostin (2003) for a detailed analysis of this issue. 
6 In a theoretical background it also requires that F(T)=0. 
7 For the sake of simplicity we choose a zero discount rate. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
30
8 Conditions for risk aversion are u′(c)>0 and u′′(c)<0. The Inada conditions imply that u′(0)=∞ 
and u′(∞)=0. The specific utility function for implementing the experiment is u(c) = 10 * Square 
Root (c). 
9 For the sake of simplicity we choose a zero discount rate. 
10See Hey and Dardadoni (1988), Ballinger et al (2003), Carbone and Hey (2004) and Camerer 
and Chua (2005) for experimental evidence of this issue. 
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